This Policy Paper aims to fill a significant gap in the policy and academic literature on the process and design of interim constitutions in conflict-affected settings.
It argues that, unlike both peace agreements and interim arrangements, the strength of interim constitutions lies in their legal enforceability. It examines the diversity of post-1990 interim constitutions in terms of their structure and their role in broader peacebuilding processes.
One of its main conclusions is that, despite key differences that also relate to the relationship between the country context and the choice of procedure and design, interim constitutions potentially offer time or the opportunity to facilitate consensus over time. They also have the potential to contribute to a culture of participatory constitutionalism, and address sequencing issues around elections and the strengthening of key institutions responsible for implementing constitutional frameworks.
2. Interim constitutions: a conceptual framework
3. Interim constitutions in conflict-affected settings
4. The design of interim constitutions
5. The process of drafting interim constitutions
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